We hackers love cheat sheets so here are mine for AWS IAM, EC2, S3 Buckets and Lambda Functions. In Part I we showed what approaches you can take for enumerating an AWS environment. This time, we’ll present you a cheat sheet of commands that will help you in lateral movement, privilege escalation and data exfiltration.
1. IAM (Identity and Access Management)
This is the place that usually gives you the most powerful attack vectors. Giving the wrong permission, setting a lax role trust relationship or having groups with admin privileges are some examples of insecure configurations that I encounter all the time. The only thing left is creating an attack vector.
A cheat sheet for IAM resources:
# USERS # list users aws iam list-users # list groups of an user aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name $username # list policies attached to a user aws iam list-user-policies --user-name $username aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name $username # list signing certificates of a user aws iam list-signing-certificates --user-name $username # list ssh public keys aws iam list-ssh-public-keys --user-name $username # get SSH key details aws iam get-ssh-public-key --user-name $username --encoding PEM --ssh-public-key-id $ssh_id # check mfa devices of users aws iam list-virtual-mfa-devices # check if user can login in web console aws iam get-login-profile --user-name $username # GROUPS # list groups for the AWS account aws iam list-groups # list group policies aws iam list-group-policies --group-name $group_name aws iam list-attached-group-policies --group-name $group_name # POLICIES # list policies for AWS account aws iam list-policies # filter for customer managed policies aws iam list-policies --scope Local | grep -A2 PolicyName # check policy details aws iam get-policy --policy-arn $policy_arn # check policy version which will also details the given permission. version-id from previous command aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn $policy_arn --version-id $version_id # check policy for user aws iam get-user-policy --user-name $username --policy-name $policy_name # ROLES # list roles for AWS account aws iam list-roles # check details for role aws iam get-role --role-name $role_name # check for policies attached to role aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name $role_name aws iam list-role-policies --role-name $role_name # get details for those policies aws iam get-role-policy --role-name $role --policy-name $policy
Now, what can you do with this information? By enumerating this you can determine what you need to do to complete the attack vector. Some examples:
- A role has admin privileges and can be assumed by all the users within the account. Two users do not use MFA. The missing piece of the attack vector would be the compromise of one user account from those two.
- A group has admin privileges. We need to find a way to add an user that’s in our control there
- A role for EC2 instances has admin privileges. We need to compromise an EC2 instance that’s using this role and exfiltrate the access credentials
We keep things simple for the moment, but we don’t actually need IAM resources with admin privileges. Is enough to compromise resources with permissions that can lead to a privilege escalation attack.
All privilege escalation vectors include IAM actions. Here is a list of actions that can directly lead to privesc and should be further analyzed:
2. S3 Buckets
S3 buckets are interesting and more than often misconfigured. The worst thing is having a public bucket with private data, but there are other things that matter as well. For example, missing encryption at rest or in transit, missing access logging, missing versioning where needed and so on.
The cheat sheet for S3 Bucket enumeration:
# if the endpoint is private, then it must be used the --endpoint switch # aws --endpoint http://$ip:$port s3api list-buckets # list buckets aws s3api list-buckets --query "Buckets.Name" aws s3 ls # check bucket location aws s3api get-bucket-location --bucket $bucket_name # enumerate bucket objects aws s3api list-objects-v2 --bucket $bucket_name aws s3api list-objects --bucket $bucket_name aws s3 ls $bucket_name # check object versions aws s3api list-object-versions --bucket $bucket_name # check bucket ACLs and object ACLs aws s3api get-bucket-acl --bucket $bucket_name aws s3api get-object-acl --bucket $bucket_name --key $file_name # download objects from the S3 bucket aws s3 cp s3://$bucket_name/$file_name $local_path # check bucket policy status aws s3api get-bucket-policy-status --bucket $bucket_name --output text | python -m json.tool # check public access for a bucket aws s3api get-public-access-block --bucket $bucket_name # check if object listing is allowed for anonymous users # should get something like directory listing if allowed curl http://$domain/$bucket_name | xmllint --format -f # check if ListBucket is explicitly allowed aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket $bucket_name
I’ve seen organizations storing access keys and other credentials in S3 buckets, so having access inside the bucket can be very useful.
A bucket can be made public in multiple ways. One way is to explicitly make it public by not blocking public access from the web console.
Another way, more subtle to errors, is through the use of bucket policy. The bucket can be made public by allowing all principles to perform actions on the bucket.
My favorite way however is when people grant access to “Authenticated” principles, believing that they grant access to the users within the account. In fact, this grants access to any AWS user from the internet, which is almost as making the bucket public.
If you don’t have listing permissions over the bucket you can enumerate it as an web application with tools like dirb or gobuster.
You can find bucket names by following the next URL structure: https://bucket-name.s3.amazonaws.com.
Now, for enumerating files, all you have to do is run a normal directory enumeration using a wordlist.
Having access to an EC2 instance can give you the right foothold for moving to an on-premises AD network or target other cloud services.
In most cases, people deploy EC2 instances and need them to perform some kind of actions, but for that you need permissions. The recommended way to grant permissions to an EC2 instance is through roles. Not every cloud engineer is aware that the access keys can be exfiltrated through the Metadata API.
The worst thing is when the EC2 instance exposes a vulnerable web application to the internet and the access keys can be exfiltrated from there. However, that’s not the only thing that matters. What if you can connect or run commands on that EC2 instance? Maybe credentials are stored in the instance’s user data. Going even further, maybe the EC2 instance can communicate with critical systems from other VPCs.
Below is a cheat sheet for enumerating the most important aspects of EC2.
# EC2 # list instances aws ec2 describe-instances # check if they use Metadata API version 1 (easier to exfil access keys) aws ec2 describe-instances --filters Name=metadata-options.http-tokens,Values=optional # get user data of instances and look for secrets aws ec2 describe-instance-attribute --instance-id $id --attribute userData --output text --query "UserData.Value" | base64 --decode # list volumes aws ec2 describe-volumes # list snapshots (check if anything is public) aws ec2 describe-snapshots # list security groups aws ec2 describe-security-groups # list security groups that allow SSH from the internet (from-port and to-port is used for port range) aws ec2 describe-security-groups --filters Name=ip-permission.from-port,Values=22 Name=ip-permission.to-port,Values=22 Name=ip-permission.cidr,Values='0.0.0.0/0' # better yet, just check for ingress rules from the internet aws ec2 describe-security-groups --filters Name=ip-permission.cidr,Values='0.0.0.0/0' # get EC2 instances that are part of a fleet aws ec2 describe-fleet-instances # get details about existing fleets aws ec2 describe-fleets # list dedicated hosts that can contains multiple EC2 instances aws ec2 describe-hosts # list profile association for each instances aws ec2 describe-iam-instance-profile-associations # find what role is allocated to a instance profile aws iam get-instance-profile --instance-profile-name $name # display private AMIs aws ec2 describe-images --filters "Name=is-public,Values=false" # list names of SSH keys aws ec2 describe-key-pairs # retrieve latest console output from an instance # output differs based on OS aws ec2 get-console-output --instance-id $id --output text # takes a screenshot of the terminal and returns it as base64 aws ec2 get-console-screenshot --instance-id $id # get the admin password for an EC2 instance # the returned password is encrypted with the key pair specified when creating the instance # if you want the clear text data, include the next parameter: --priv-launch-key local-path-key aws ec2 get-password-data --instance-id $id # VPN # list client VPN endpoints aws ec2 describe-client-vpn-endpoints # list active connections or connections terminated in the last 60 minutes # can return domain users if VPN integrated with AD aws ec2 describe-client-vpn-connections --client-vpn-endpoint-id $id # check if anyone can connect, from which AD group and more aws ec2 describe-client-vpn-authorization-rules --client-vpn-endpoint-id $id # list customer VPN gateways aws ec2 describe-customer-gateways # list site to site VPN connections aws ec2 describe-vpn-connections # Network # list elastic IPs aws ec2 describe-addresses # list gateways aws ec2 describe-internet-gateways aws ec2 describe-local-gateways aws ec2 describe-nat-gateways aws ec2 describe-transit-gateways aws ec2 describe-vpn-gateways # list network interfaces (a lot of useful information) aws ec2 describe-network-interfaces # list VPCs aws ec2 describe-vpcs # list subnets aws ec2 describe-subnets # list network ACLs # useful when filtering on specific VPCs/subnets (--filters Name=vpc-id,Values=$id) aws ec2 describe-network-acls # list VPC endpoints aws ec2 describe-vpc-endpoints # list allowed connections between VPC pairs aws ec2 describe-vpc-peering-connections
You can formulate various attack vectors based on the collected information, for example:
- Find EC2 instances with high permissions that expose web applications to the internet. Try to exploit the web applications in order to get the access credentials.
- Search for EC2 instances with SSH open. Try to find the SSH key from S3 buckets, the instance’s user data or other AWS services. After connecting to it, exfiltrate access credentials or leverage any peer connection between VPCs in order to access private instances
- Download any public EBS snapshot or start an instance with a public AMI. Look over the files on disk.
4. Lambda Functions
Lambda Functions were always an interesting point of attack because, if a function has an execution role, you can exfiltrate the access credentials from it by reading the environmental variable from “/proc/self/environ”.
The best attack with Lambda Functions is to create a new function (or edit an existing one) that would retrieve the access credentials. Make sure you pass it an execution role with high privileges. This is one well known privilege escalation vector in AWS. But it’s not always possible and when that’s the case, my focus is on checking if any credentials are passed as environmental variables, if a role with high privileges is attached to it and if there are any source code vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
Until recently, the way to make a Lambda Function accessible from the internet was to integrate it with an API Gateway. Now, there is a new method to do that, by enabling function URL. This would generate a link for your function that can be accessed directly from a browser. While it’s still not so popular, I believe it increases the security risk of the environment. Finding vulnerabilities from a source code review can be more rewarding for functions that use this feature so make sure to keep an eye on them.
Additionally, you might use this as a backdoor: add a snippet of code in an existing function that would retrieve the access credentials, enable the function’s URL if is not already and that’s it. No need to have the permission of invoking the function.
The Lambda Function cheat sheet:
# List functions aws lambda list-functions # get a single function # the --function-name supports both arn and function name on all commands # you can get a specific version with "--function-name $name:$version" aws lambda get-function --function-name $name # list versions of function aws lambda list-versions-by-function --function-name $name # get function's code download link aws lambda get-function --function-name $name --query 'Code.Location' # get information like the role attached to the function, version in use, runtime, entry function and more aws lambda get-function-configuration --function-name $name # get the function's resource-based policy aws lambda get-policy --function-name $name # list events that invoked functions aws lambda list-event-source-mappings --function-name $name # get configuration for successful and unsusscessful invocations # good to know if someone will be alerted in case you generate errors in your tests aws lambda get-function-event-invoke-config --function-name $name # list urls for function aws lambda list-function-url-configs --function-name $name # get the function's URL (if enabled) along with the authentication method used # if URL is enabled and authentication is NONE it meens that can be accessed by anyone on the internet aws lambda get-function-url-config --function-name $name # list lambda layers which are like reusable code libraries aws lambda list-layers # get the layer version's arn aws lambda get-layer-version-by-arn --arn $layer_arn # get a link to download the layer so that you can look through the code aws lambda get-layer-version --layer-name $layer_name --version-number $version # get policy of a layer and look for misconfiguarions like over permissive statements aws lambda get-layer-version-policy --layer-name $layer_name --version-number $version
I often encounter functions with source code vulnerabilities as developers think the functions are far from prying eyes and they don’t apply the same secure practices as when building internet facing applications.
If you’re doing a cloud configuration review, you might not have time to check the code of multiple functions, but if you’re in a red team engagement, these function can represent the next step in escalating your privileges so performing source code review might be worth it.
As a last tip, check if the functions are storing credentials in the code/configuration files. Usually the luck is on your side.
5. Closing thoughts
There are other services that deserve a chapter, like API Gateways, Secrets Manager, Parameter Store, KMS and so on. They might be in a future article as this one got quite long.
Until then, make sure to check these commands, leave a comment with suggestions if you feel like I missed something and good luck in getting AdminstratorAccess.